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The price contagion effects of financial reporting fraud and reputational losses:  
Evidence from the individual audit partner level  
 
 
Abstract  
This study investigates the price contagion effects of Chinese audit partners whose 
clients have been sanctioned by regulators for financial reporting fraud and their associated 
reputational losses after we control for low quality audit offices/firms. The results suggest 
that the price contagion effects occur primarily through a common partner rather than 
through a common audit office or firm. Cross-sectional tests show that the price contagion 
effects are more pronounced when (1) the low quality partners failed to issue modified audit 
opinion during the fraud period, (2) the low quality partners were from the Top 10 audit 
firms, (3) the size of the sanction firm is larger and (4) there is a shorter time lapse between 
the sanction announcement date and fraud period. Finally, we show that low quality audit 
partners suffer from reputational losses in terms of a reduced market share caused by a 
failure to retain existing clients and attract new clients and a higher likelihood of partner 
turnover. 
 
Keywords: Audit partner; Audit quality; Contagion effects; Reputational loss; Market 
reactions 
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The price contagion effects of financial reporting fraud and reputational losses:  
Evidence from the individual audit partner level 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we investigate the stock price contagion effects for the low quality audits 
of individual audit partners and the associated reputational losses in China. We view the 
audit quality of a partner to be low when his/her clients have been sanctioned by regulators 
owing to financial reporting fraud. Contagion occurs when an adverse event, such as 
financial reporting fraud, at one firm also conveys negative information about the valuation 
of other firms in the same industry, especially when they use the same external audit firm 
as fraud firms (Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson 2008). Consequently, audit firms (or offices) 
that provide low quality audits suffer reputational losses (Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang 
2008; Swanquist and Whited 2015). However, it is unclear whether the price contagion 
effects and reputational losses documented in prior literature reside at the audit firm/office 
level or at the individual audit partner level. This study attempts to explore this issue by 
investigating the market valuation of non-fraud firms audited by the same audit partners as 
firms that are being sanctioned by regulators owing to financial reporting concerns and the 
audit market consequences of these low quality partners.  
This study is motivated by three major factors. First, prior studies that examine the 
price contagion effects of accounting information typically focus on the audit firm or office 
level. For example, Chaney and Philipich (2002) find that Arthur Andersen’s clients 
experienced a statistically significant negative market reaction when the auditors admitted 
that they shredded a substantial number of Enron documents and that companies that were 
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audited by Andersen’s Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns 
than other companies. Weber et al. (2008) report that audit clients of KPMG Germany 
experienced a negative market reaction after a highly publicized accounting scandal. 
Additionally, Gleason et al. (2008) document that accounting restatements that adversely 
affect shareholder wealth at the restating firm also induce share price declines among non-
restating firms in the same industry and that this effect is more pronounced when peer and 
restating firms use the same external audit firm. However, ex-ante it is unclear whether the 
contagion effects extend only to other clients of low quality individual audit partners or all 
clients of offices/firms associated with poor audit quality. Our paper attempts to shed light 
on this issue.  
Second, prior studies examine the reputational loss at either the audit firm or audit 
office level (e.g., Weber et al. 2008; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Swanquist and Whited 
2015). Reputational loss at the firm level is different from reputational loss at individual 
partner level. Firm-level loss is not related to idiosyncratic incidences of financial fraud; it 
is related to quality issues that are at the firm level driven by weak quality control system. 
However, partner-level loss could be idiosyncratic and unique to the specific partner, and 
it may not impair the reputation and reduce the market share of the firm. Whether the loss 
of market share arising from perceived poor audit quality occurs at the partner level or the 
office/firm level is unclear. We empirically examine this issue.  
Third, prior audit quality studies have largely focused on the firm level or the city-
based practice office level. Recently, there have been increasing calls for more research at 
the individual audit partner level to yield better insights into the auditing process (DeFond 
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and Zhang 2014). Indeed, several studies have moved to examine audit quality issues at the 
individual auditor level (Gul, Wu and Yang 2013; Aobdia, Lin, and Petacchi 2015); 
however, we are not aware of any study that has simultaneously considered the contagion 
effects of financial reporting fraud at both the firm and partner level. In line with these calls 
and recent evidence, in this paper, we examine the contagion effects at both the firm/office 
and audit partner level.  
We exploit two important unique institutional features in China. The first feature is 
that two auditors of each audit engagement are required to sign the audit report in China.1 
The two signing auditors are either partners or senior managers, and they play a similar role 
as engagement partners in the U.S. The second feature is that the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) publishes findings from investigations of fraud cases 
similar to the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) in the U.S. Hence, 
the announcement dates of these reports enable researchers to investigate the market 
reaction to non-fraud firms audited by the same audit partner as the sanctioned firms.  
Our sample includes 327 sanction announcements associated with financial reporting 
fraud during the period 1999–2012. These regulatory sanctions are against firms in China 
whose financial statements are challenged for accounting malfeasance. An audit partner 
who audited a sanctioned firm during the years when financial reporting fraud occurred is 
identified as a “low quality partner” (hereafter LQP) 2 . We then examine the market 
                                                          
1 China’s Independent Auditing Standard (CIAS) requires that at least two auditors sign an audit report. In 
our sample, a small fraction of the reports (335 reports, about 1.5%) are signed by three auditors.  
2 This definition also applies to low quality audit offices and low quality audit firms. We denote an audit 
office (firm) that audited a sanctioned firm during the years when financial reporting fraud occurred as a “low 
quality audit office (firm)” (LQAO; LQAF). 
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reactions to four types of non-fraud firms during these sanction announcements: (1) firms 
audited by a LQP; (2) firms audited by a low quality audit office (LQAO); (3) firms audited 
by a low quality audit firm (LQAF); (4) firms audited by a different audit firm. We find 
that five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are significantly negative for the 
contagion firms that are audited by an LQAO, consistent with the findings in Chaney and 
Philipich (2002) and Francis and Michas (2013). However, the office level effect 
disappears once we control for the price contagion effects at the individual audit partner 
level; we only observe a significantly negative market reaction for contagion firms audited 
by an LQP. Additional cross-sectional analysis shows that the price contagion effects of 
LQPs are more pronounced when the LQPs failed to issue modified audit opinions on the 
sanction firms during the fraud period and when the LQPs were from the Top 10 audit firms. 
Further, with respect to the fraud firms, we find that the price contagion effects are stronger 
when the size of the sanction firms is larger and when the time lapse between the sanction 
announcement and fraud occurrence is shorter. We next investigate the reputational losses 
of LQPs on the audit partner labor market after the announcement of regulatory sanctions. 
Consistent with prior studies (Weber et al. 2008; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Swanquist 
and Whited 2015), we find that LQPs suffer from both losing their existing clients and 
acquiring less new clients and that clients audited by LQPs are more likely to change 
partners after the sanctions.  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in several important ways. First, prior 
studies that examine the price contagion effects of accounting information typically focus 
on the audit firm or audit office (Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber et al. 2008). We push 
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the unit of analysis down to the partner level and compare the firm/office and partner level. 
In this way, we are able to test whether it is the firm/office level or partner level contagion 
effect that is more important. Our findings on the significant effect of LQPs and the 
nonsignificant effect of LQAOs/LQAFs when tested together suggest that the price 
contagion effects occur primarily through a common partner rather than through a common 
audit office or firm. This finding is not available in the extant audit quality contagion 
literature. Moreover, prior studies suffer from the limitation that they examine only one 
highly publicized scandal, thus increasing the risk that the documented stock market 
reactions are spurious. For example, Nelson, Price, and Rountree (2008) show that the 
results of Chaney and Philipich (2002) are driven by confounding effects in the oil industry 
rather than damage to the auditor's reputation. Therefore, it is useful to examine a setting 
such as China where there are multiple accounting scandals. 
Second, although Gul et al. (2013) provide evidence of significant audit partner fixed 
effects in China, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) raise some methodological concerns with 
the use of F-tests to detect individual styles. They show that F-tests on manager-specific 
dummy variables are biased and are invalid indicators of managerial-style effects. This bias 
potentially affects numerous studies in the management style or individual audit partner 
literature, as they rely on F-tests to draw inferences about manager or partner fixed effects. 
In comparison, our setting does not rely on the audit partner fixed effects; instead, we draw 
inferences directly from the price contagion effects and consequences of low quality work 
performed by audit partners. Our research design is more likely to detect, if any, the audit 
quality effect of individual partner. 
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Third, although prior studies have examined the cross-sectional associations between 
audit partner characteristics and financial reporting quality, they suffer from the limitation 
that audit partners are assigned endogenously to their clients. For example, Aobdia et al. 
(2015) find that partner quality is positively associated with ERCs and negatively 
associated with IPO underpricing. While such cross-sectional results are interesting, there 
is a concern that they may be explained by endogeneity; i.e., high quality partners are more 
conservative and more likely to select clients with lower risk. In our study, such 
endogeneity is less of a concern because the regulatory sanctions against fraud firms are 
exogenous. Specifically, the sanctions are targeted at fraud firms audited by LQPs, but we 
are investigating the market reactions of other non-fraud firms audited by the same LQPs. 
Consequently, our market reaction tests are less likely to suffer from endogeneity problems 
as long as stock prices already impound all publicly available information. Although 
Aobdia et al. (2015) document positive market reactions when companies switch to higher 
quality partners, their market reaction tests are not consistently significant across 
alternative event windows. For example, their results are nonsignificant when the three-day 
window CAR (-1, +1) are used. In contrast, our market reaction results are robust to several 
different event windows, including CAR (-1, +1).  
Fourth, we also contribute to the growing literature on audit partners. Prior studies 
show that high quality partners are valued by capital markets (Aobdia et al. 2015) and that 
the quality of audit partners has a direct bearing on audit quality (Carcello and Li 2013; Gul 
et al. 2013; Knechel, Vanstraelen, and Zerni 2015). We extend this literature by showing 
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new evidence that individual audit partners that perform poor-quality audit are penalized 
by the audit labor market.  
Our study is related to a concurrent study by Li, Qi, Tian, and Zhang (2016), who also 
examine the contagion effect of low quality audit, as proxied by accounting restatements, 
at the individual partner level. However, our study differs from this study in several 
important aspects. First, the study of Li et al. (2016) likely suffers from the endogeneity 
problem mentioned earlier. In particular, the "contagion" that they document could reflect 
the characteristics of the clients audited by the partners rather than the characteristics of the 
partners themselves. Our study is less subject to this endogeneity issue since we investigate, 
at the announcement dates of regulatory sanctions, whether market valuation of non-fraud 
firms is affected by the sanctions. Second, our focus is on financial reporting fraud, which 
is a more severe audit failure that results in regulatory sanctions than the restatements used 
in their study. Third, we examine the reputational losses of audit partners after the 
regulatory sanctions, which are not investigated in their study. Although Li et al. (2016) 
also use a small number of government sanctions against individual auditors, as an 
alternative proxy for audit failures in their sensitivity check, to examine stock market 
reactions to the public disclosure of the sanctions, their findings are not tabulated, and 
hence, we are not able to directly compare the results. They find significantly negative 
CARs around the public disclosure of sanctions for the non-fraud clients audited by the 
sanctioned auditor. In comparison, our study examines all regulatory sanctions on firms, 
including partners that are being sanctioned and partners not being sanctioned for financial 
fraud. We find that the contagion effect also exists for non-fraud firms audited by non-
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sanctioned partners, indicating that the contagion effect is not limited to the sanctioned 
partners, as documented in Li et al. (2016), but applicable to other non-sanctioned partners.  
Finally, it is worth noting that our study provides some insight into the international 
debate on the merits and demerits of requiring auditor signatures on audit reports.3 Our 
study complements prior research (e.g., Li et al. 2016; Aobdia et al. 2015) by providing 
indirect evidence that the availability of audit partners’ signature can assist the capital 
market and the audit market in making informed decisions on audit quality.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and 
presents the research hypotheses. Sections III and IV describe the research design, sample, 
and empirical findings for the price contagion and reputation loss tests, respectively. 
Section V presents the results for the sensitivity checks. We conclude the paper in Section 
VI. 
II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE  
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional background of the Chinese audit market 
The Chinese audit market provides an appropriate setting for analyzing our research 
questions for several important reasons. First, China’s auditing standards require that 
engagement auditors sign the audit reports and disclose the related information to the public. 
Typically, two engagement auditors sign each audit report, with the more senior signing 
auditor mainly performing the review work and the relatively junior signing auditor mainly 
                                                          
3 Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the U.S. has adopted new rules 
that require audit firms to disclose, among other information, the name of the engagement partner for each 
audit (PCAOB 2015). See http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket029/Release-2015-008.pdf. 
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administering the fieldwork (Gul et al. 2013).4 This arrangement provides the identity of 
the individual auditors.  
Second, we use regulatory sanctions against firms for accounting malfeasance to infer 
the low audit quality of the partner who audits sanctioned firms. 5 The accounting 
malfeasance includes misstatement of revenue, income, assets or other items that materially 
change the financial position of a firm. China’s Securities Law gives the CSRC authority 
to sanction firms and individuals suspected of securities and financial reporting fraud. The 
findings of the CSRC investigations are published, where internal warnings are issued for 
minor violations, and stronger punishments, including suspension of trading, withdrawal 
of licenses, civil penalties, and criminal prosecution, are enforced for material malpractice 
(Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui 2006). Generally, there is a time lag between sanction 
announcements and the occurrence of financial reporting fraud. On average, it takes about 
1.9 years, with a maximum of 12 years, for financial reporting fraud to be uncovered. The 
announcement dates of the sanctions against firms with severe financial reporting concerns 
are publicly available, which facilitates an investigation of the price contagion effects of 
sanctions on other firms audited by the same audit partners. 
                                                          
4 The audit reports in China are predominantly signed by two partners: the review partner and engagement 
partner. Following Lennox, Wu and Zhang (2014), we define the first signature partner as the review partner 
because the name of the review partner is disclosed in the audit report above the name of the engagement 
partner.  
5 These regulatory sanctions are similar to the AAERs in the U.S. Prior studies use AAERs as a proxy for 
fraudulent financial reporting that indicates audit failure (e.g., Bonner, Palmrose, and Young 1998; Carcello 
and Nagy 2004; Lennox and Pittman 2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Our definition of low quality audit is 
broader than that of Li et al. (2016) and Aobdia et al. (2015), who consider only sanctioned partner as having 
low quality. In contrast, we view the audit quality of partners whose clients are being sanctioned to be low, 
regardless of whether the partners are being sanctioned by regulators. Among the 327 sanction events used 
in our study, there are 53 (16.21%) sanctions where the individual audit partners are also sanctioned owing 
to accounting fraud. We find that the price contagion effect exists for both partners being sanctioned and 
partners not being sanctioned. We also find that there is no significant difference in the market reactions 
between partners being sanctioned and partners not being sanctioned. 
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Third, the Chinese audit market is ideally suitable for investigating partner reputational 
losses, since it is characterized by low investor protection, low litigation risk for auditors 
(Chen, Sun, and Wu 2010; Wang, Yu, and Zhao 2015) and a less developed legal and 
institutional structure than that found in more developed countries (Chen et al. 2006). In 
China, auditors are unlikely to be a source of insurance for investors. There have been a 
large number of fraud cases, where angry investors have launched numerous lawsuits but 
no payouts have been made by audit firms (Hutchens 2003). China thus provides a good 
context for studying the effect of reputation as a disciplining mechanism for audit partners. 
The fierce competition in the Chinese audit market further exacerbates the reputational 
consequences of audit partners’ poor audit quality (Chen et al. 2010). In the U.S. and other 
developed countries, the Big 4 auditors audit the majority of listed companies, whereas in 
China, the percentage of listed companies audited by the Big 4 auditors is only about 26% 
(Chen, Su, and Wu 2007).6  
Audit Partners and Audit Quality 
While prior research on audit quality largely focuses on the audit firm (e.g., DeAngelo 
1981; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999) or branch office (e.g., Reynolds and Francis 
2000; Francis and Yu 2009) level, a recent trend in auditing research suggests that 
examination of the audit process at the engagement partner and team personnel level will 
yield better insights into the auditing process (Carcello and Li 2013; Gul et al. 2013). For 
                                                          
6The number of audit firms qualified to audit listed companies has declined over time because of mergers and 
acquisitions. However, since the number of partners have increased more than the number of listed firms, 
partner-level competition remains as fierce as before. On average, the number of clients per audit partner was 
2.80 and 2.37 in year 2000 and 2012, respectively. Consequently, such a buyer’s market is likely to afford 
clients more bargaining power and impose pressure on auditors fighting for their slice of the pie (Chen et al. 
2007). A senior partner from KPMG in China also informally confirmed that the Chinese auditing market 
remains very competitive.  
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example, using data from Taiwan, Aobdia et al. (2015) report that the identity of individual 
audit partners provides informational value to capital market participants beyond the value 
provided by the identity of the audit firms.  
Despite substantial variation in audit quality across different partners (Gul et al. 2013), 
a high (low) quality partner tends to perform high (low) quality work consistently across 
all engagements. Consistent with this idea, Knechel et al. (2015) find that companies 
audited by an individual partner, even in different industries, tend to exhibit similar levels 
of aggressiveness or conservativeness in audit reporting over time, and Li et al. (2016) find 
that individual audit partners with an audit failure also deliver lower quality on other audit 
engagements. This implies that while audit quality varies across the spectrum of audit 
partners, there appears to be consistency in the quality of their performance. Hence we 
could expect this will also have an impact on the market’s perception of quality of those 
partner’s other engagements. Further, we also expect that this could influence the reaction 
of labor market/client firms, when a signal of partner quality is available. 
Price Contagion Effect of Low Quality Audit Partners 
Prior research on information transfer theory typically examines the share price 
contagion effect of information releases by one firm on other firms, usually in the same 
industry. For example, prior studies document the presence of price contagion effects for 
earnings announcements (Foster 1981), earnings forecasts by management (Han, Wild, and 
Ramesh 1989), bankruptcy announcements (Lang and Stulz 1992), and accounting 
restatements (Gleason et al. 2008), among others. Information transfer occurs when news 
released by one firm affects the stock prices of other firms. Specifically, information, or 
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news, about one reporting entity (e.g., accounting fraud) can affect investors’ reactions to 
different reporting entities with similar characteristics. Building on the information transfer 
literature, we conjecture that an audit partner auditing a client in which an accounting fraud 
is discovered in one firm may cause investors to reevaluate their position owing to the 
increased uncertainty associated with the audit quality of other firms audited by the same 
audit partner. For example, when an audit failure is publicized, other clients of the auditor 
experience a significant loss of market value (Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber et al. 
2008; Cahan, Emanuel, and Sun 2009; Huang and Li 2009; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). 
Gleason et al. (2008) provide evidence that the announcement of an accounting restatement 
by a firm causes investors to reassess the content and credibility of the financial statements 
of its peer firms. Specifically, they show that non-restating companies in the same industry 
as a restating company also experience negative market reactions after the announcement 
of the restatement, indicating that investors extend their concerns regarding accounting 
quality to other companies in the same industry. They further report that the price contagion 
effect is stronger if the restating firms and their peers share the same audit firm.  
We extend these prior studies by studying the price contagion effects at the individual 
audit partner level. Research on information transfer suggests that information from an 
announcing firm is useful for investors in updating their expectations of similar information 
on other firms that share some common characteristics with the announcing firm. We 
conjecture that financial fraud in a firm can cause investors to perceive the audit quality of 
a partner to be low when his/her clients are being sanctioned by regulators owing to 
financial reporting concerns. Recent research also suggests that the stock market appears 
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to recognize the audit quality of the audit partner. For example, Aobdia et al. (2015) find a 
positive association between individual audit partners’ quality and earnings response 
coefficients; this finding suggests that investors perceive earnings to be more informative 
when a higher quality partner performs the audit. They also find that markets react 
positively when firms switch from a lower quality partner to a higher quality partner and 
that firms audited by higher quality partners experience a lower level of underpricing when 
they go public. 
In our setting, the audit quality of audit partners is likely to be perceived as low if their 
clients are sanctioned by regulators owing to financial reporting fraud. The announcement 
of the sanction conveys both a negative signal about the firm’s underlying true value 
(Titman and Trueman 1986) and a negative signal about the perceived quality of the audit 
partner (Dye 1993). Consequently, investors are likely to revise their expectations of the 
audit quality of other firms audited by the same partner downward, and the share prices of 
these firms are thus likely to decrease. Such a drop in share prices is consistent with the 
notion that the audit quality problem is perceived to be shared by all firms audited by the 
same audit partner. The above reasoning leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The share price decline is greater for non-fraud firms audited by the same audit partner 
as firms sanctioned for financial reporting fraud than for benchmark firms. 
 
We examine the market reactions of four distinct groups of non-fraud firms after 
sanction announcements: (1) firms audited by a LQP; (2) firms audited by a LQAO; (3) 
firms audited by a LQAF; and (4) non-contagion firms audited by a different audit firm. 
The firms in group (1) constitute our primary treatment firms, while firms in groups (2) to 
(4) are our benchmark firms.  
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Although prior studies have established the contagion effect at either the firm or office 
level (e.g., Chaney and Philipich 2002; Weber et al. 2008), it is ex-ante unclear whether the 
contagion effects will extend to other clients of individual audit partners associated with 
poor audit quality. If the price contagion effects at the audit firm/office level documented 
in prior studies reflect some fundamental issues in the internal quality control at the audit 
firm/office level, we will not find any incremental effect of low quality audit partners in 
the price contagion test. Thus, whether the price contagion effect of financial reporting 
fraud is driven by low quality partners is an empirical issue. 
Low Quality Audit Partners and Reputational Losses  
We also investigate the reputational loss of LQPs on the audit partner labor market 
after the announcement of regulatory sanctions. High quality external auditing depends on 
two principal forces that motivate auditors to deliver quality: a litigation/insurance 
incentive and a reputational incentive (Simunic 1980; DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993). 
Empirically separating the effects of litigation/insurance from those of reputation in 
markets such as the U.S. is difficult because the largest audit firms have both the largest 
litigation incentives and the strongest reputational incentives. Since the Chinese audit 
environment is characterized by very low litigation risk relative to that in the U.S. (Chen et 
al. 2010; Wang et al. 2015), it is a more appropriate setting for which to study the 
reputational consequences of audit partners associated with financial reporting fraud. 
Further, the fierce competition in the Chinese audit market exacerbates the reputational 
consequences of partners’ poor audit quality (Chen et al. 2010).  
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In this study, we focus on individual partner reputation for several reasons. First, 
partner-level characteristics exhibit significant variation across firms and locations (Gul et 
al. 2013). Second, since the individual audit partner is largely responsible for personnel 
assignment, client contracting, and many other strategic functions (Nelson and Tan 2005), 
it follows that partner-specific factors should contribute to audit quality and auditor 
reputation. We expect that low quality audits should also result in a loss of market share 
for low quality audit partners and that this decline in market share is expected to arise at 
the individual audit partner level. Further, to the extent that the audit partners of sanctioned 
firms are perceived to have low audit quality, we expect low quality audit partners to exhibit 
greater turnover at the client level. Based on this reasoning, we formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: The market share of low quality audit partners is lower after the announcement of the 
financial reporting fraud than that of all other audit partners.  
 
H2b: The incidence of a change in audit partner is higher for firms audited by low quality 
audit partners after the announcement of financial reporting fraud than for benchmark firms. 
  
 
III. PRICE CONTAGION TESTS  
Empirical Model  
In H1, we test whether the price contagion effect, measured in terms of market reaction 
to sanctions, exists at individual audit partner. Specifically, we estimate the following 
cross-sectional regressions: 
CAR= β0 + β1 LQP + β2 LQAO + β3 LQAF + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 MTB + β7 ROA 
 + β8 LARGEST+ β9 ABS_DA+ β10 TOP10+ β11 N_LINKS + β12 N_LAPSE 
 + β13 SIZEsanction + β14 CARsanction + Year/Industry/Audit office fixed-effects + ε   (1) 
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where CAR represents firms’ five-day CARs around the corresponding sanction 
announcement date (-2, +2), where date 0 represents the day of a sanction announcement, 
if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement.7 Daily abnormal 
returns are calculated as a firm’s raw returns minus the weighted adjusted market returns 
on the corresponding day. LQP (LQAO, LQAF) is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm is audited by the same low quality partners (the same low quality audit office 
(LQAO), the same low quality audit firm (LQAF)) as the corresponding sanction firm 
during the fraud periods or current period (defined as one year before the sanction 
announcement date) and zero otherwise.8 H1 is supported if the coefficient estimate on 
LQP is significantly negative. 
We include a wide array of controls based on prior studies that may potentially affect 
the stock returns around the sanction announcements (see the Appendix). All control 
variables, except CARsanction, are measured at the fiscal year end just prior to the sanction 
announcement date. We control for firm size (SIZE) since larger firms are subject to closer 
scrutiny by investors, and this greater capital market pressure will heighten investors’ 
concerns over the contagion firms’ financial reporting quality that will likely exacerbate 
the price contagion effect (Gleason et al. 2008; Chen and Goh 2013). Consistent with 
                                                          
7Consistent with Yu, Zhang and Zheng (2015), we use (-2, +2) as the window period. Our results are not 
sensitive to the choice of window periods. We report the results using different window periods in the 
robustness checks. 
8We also use the current period to identify contagion firms because the firms audited by low quality partners 
currently are also likely to be affected by the sanction announcement. In additional tests, we further separate 
contagion firms into three subgroups: firms that share the same audit partner (office or firm) as sanctioned 
firms in the fraud years but not in the current period (33.71%), firms that share the same audit partner (office 
or firm) as sanctioned firms currently but not in the fraud periods (14.64%), and firms that share the same 
audit partner (office or firm) as sanctioned firms in both the fraud and current years (51.65%). We find that 
the price contagion exists in all three subgroups. Because there is a time lag between sanction announcement 
and fraud occurrence, we also examine the effect of this time lag on the price contagion effect in the cross-
sectional analysis. 
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Gleason et al. (2008), we control for the effect of leverage (LEV), firm performance (ROA), 
and growth (MTB) on observed stock price reactions to informational events. Because large 
shareholders have a significant influence on the financial reporting process (Gul, Kim, and 
Qiu 2010; Yu et al. 2015), we include the largest shareholder’s ownership (LARGEST) to 
capture the shareholder’s monitoring role in the financial reporting process in China. 
Gleason et al. (2008) find that restatement-induced contagion stock returns are correlated 
with measures of accounting quality; thus, we control for the earnings quality (ABS_DA) 
of contagion firms and non-contagion firms prior to the sanction announcement date. We 
also control for the quality of the audit firm (TOP10) that audits the sample firms; the 
number of years that the firm was audited by low-quality partners, low-quality audit offices, 
or low-quality audit firms (N_LINKS); and the number of years that have elapsed since the 
last fraud year to the year of sanction (N_LAPSE).  
Following Gleason et al. (2008), we control for sanction firms’ CARs surrounding the 
sanction announcement date (CARsanction), as the magnitude of the information transferred 
by the event firm affects the degree of spillover (Yu et al. 2015). We also control for the 
size of the sanction firms (SIZEsanction) because larger firms are more likely to provoke 
greater contagion effects (Chen and Goh 2013)9. Finally, we include a set of indicator 
variables that represent the year, industry and audit office to control for year, industry and 
audit office fixed effects.  
Sample Selection  
                                                          
9Our results remain unchanged if we remove SIZEsanction and CARsanction from the regression model.  
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The original regulatory sanction sample comprises all regulatory sanction events 
suspected of financial reporting fraud from 1999 to 2012, collected from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database10. As shown in Panel A of Table 1, 
the sample starts with 411 sanction events.11 Data on individual audit partner and stock 
returns are also collected from the CSMAR database. We delete observations if stock 
returns around the sanction announcement date are not available (51 events), if audit 
partners are unidentifiable (20 events), or if fraudulent firms’ audit partners have no other 
clients (11 events). Finally, we exclude two sanctions that involve firms in the financial 
industry. Our final sample includes 327 regulatory sanctions announcements (involving 
275 firms) associated with financial reporting fraud during our sample period.  
Contagion Firms with a Common Audit Partner, Common Audit Office, Common 
Audit Firm and Non-Contagion Firms  
Panels B and C of Table 1 provide sample selection procedures for contagion firms 
and non-contagion firms. We define a firm as a contagion firm through a common audit 
partner (common audit office or firm) if the firm was audited by the same individual audit 
partner (the same audit office or the same audit firm) as sanction firms during the financial 
reporting fraud periods and current period. As shown in Panel B, we first identify 21,654 
                                                          
10The CSMAR database covers all kinds of corporate scandals of listed Chinese firms. They can be classified 
into five categories: (1) financial reporting fraud, misstatement of revenue, income, assets or other items that 
materially change the financial position of a firm; (2) incomplete, late or lagging information disclosure or 
information concealment; (3) corruption or others; (4) insider trading or market manipulation; and (5) other 
administrative violations, irregularities and other crimes. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Yu et al. 2015), we 
define the first category as sanctions related to financial reporting fraud.  
11We manually check each of the sanction announcement dates from multiple data resources, including public 
announcements released by the listed firms, the CSRC, stock exchanges and news reports in China’s major 
business and finance newspapers. When there is more than one date related to the same fraud sanction, we 
employ the earliest one as the announcement date to calculate CARs in price contagion tests. For all 411 
sanction events in our study, we corrected 84 (20%) announcement dates compared to the information 
acquired from CSMAR database.  
21 
 
observations as contagion firms through a common audit firm. We then delete 1,142 
observations that have insufficient stock returns data, 150 observations that belong to the 
financial industry, and 2,413 observations that have other public disclosures surrounding 
the sanction announcements12. We impose the last requirement to enhance our ability to 
detect sanction-induced stock price contagion and avoid confounding effects due to the 
announcements of other public information. Our final sample includes 17,949 firm-year 
observations as contagion firms with common audit firms. Among which, 2,421 
observations are contagion firms with common audit partners, and 10,606 are contagion 
firms with common audit offices.  
Panel C of Table 1 provides the sample selection of non-contagion benchmark firms. 
For each sanction, we identify non-contagion benchmark firms as those in the same 
industry as the sanction firm but report neither fraud nor share the same audit firm as the 
sanction firms. Industry classification is based on CSRC 2-digit codes. Since the total 
number of firms in different industries is different, ranging from 16 to 504, we further 
restrict benchmark firms to be no more than 60 firms with the closest size as the sanction 
firm.13 We obtain 17,592 matched observations. We delete 1,343 observations that have 
insufficient stock returns data and 1,493 firms that had another public disclosure during the 
sanction announcement period. Our final sample for the non-contagion firms is 14,756. In 
the price contagion effect test, we use all 32,705 (17,949 + 14,756) contagion and non-
                                                          
12  We exclude observations in which other public information was announced during the sanction 
announcement period (day -2 to day +2). Other public information includes earnings release, earnings 
warnings, de-listing, suspension of listing, annual reports, quarterly reports, special treatment (ST), and 
particular transfer (PT). 
13 If the number of non-contagion firms in the same industry as the sanction firms is less than 60, we keep 
all the firms in the same industry as the sanction firms as non-contagion firms. Our results are robust to setting 
an alternative number of restrictions (such as 50 or 70 firms) or using no restrictions. 
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contagion firm observations in the empirical analysis. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Gul et 
al. 2013), we obtain data on control variables such as financial data, stock return data, and 
ownership information from the CSMAR database. Consequently, we discard 3,104 
observations with missing data for the control variables. The final observations in the price 
contagion test are 29,601, as shown in Panel D of Table 1. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the bottom and top one percentile to mitigate the undue influence of outliers.14 
Table 2, Panels A and B, presents the distribution of sanction, contagion and non-
contagion firms based on the sanction announcement year and industry, respectively. The 
sanctions are not evenly distributed across the years. For example, 78 sanctions are 
announced in 2012, the largest number during our sample period. We present observations 
of the three types of contagion firms separately.  
Empirical Results of the Price Contagion Effect Test  
Table 3, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the price 
contagion test. The distribution of these variables is comparable to that in prior studies (e.g., 
Gul et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2015). The mean of LQP is 0.0748, indicating that 7.48% of 
observations are contagion firms with the same low quality partner (LQP) as the sanction 
firms. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we report the mean and median of CARs for a variety of window 
periods for contagion and non-contagion firms, separately. The results are consistent across 
different CARs. We focus our discussion on the five-day CAR from day -2 to day 2 (CAR 
                                                          
14We also compare the characteristics of sanction firms and non-sanction (i.e., contagion and non-contagion) 
firms during the sample period. The univariate analysis shows that sanction firms are significantly smaller 
(t=7.76), less profitable (t=13.04), less likely to be audited by Top 10 audit firms (t=3.67), and less likely to 
be state owned (t=5.30). 
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(-2, +2)) since this is the window we use to test our hypothesis. The mean and median CAR 
(-2, +2) are -0.56% and -0.86% for contagion firms with common low quality partner; -
0.12% and -0.57% for contagion firms with a common audit office but not with a common 
low quality partner; -0.08% and -0.46% for contagion firms with a common audit firm but 
without a common low quality partner or audit office; and -0.23% and -0.59% for non-
contagion firms, respectively. The negative market reaction of non-contagion firms is 
consistent with the intra-industry information transfer documented in Gleason et al. (2008).  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the univariate tests of differences in mean and median 
between contagion firms with a LQP with the benchmark firms. The difference in the CARs 
of contagion firms with a LQP from contagion firms with a LQAO but not a LQP (and 
those with a LQAF but not a LQP or LQAO) is statistically significant, indicating that 
negative market reaction to contagion firms with a common audit partner is more severe 
than that to other contagion firms. We also find that market reaction to contagion firms 
with a LQP is significantly more negative than that to non-contagion firms. These results 
provide preliminary support for H1 that the stock price decline for the contagion firms that 
share at least one common audit partner with the sanction firm is greater than that of 
benchmark firms.15  
Table 4 provides results from regression analysis of equation (1). We first re-examine 
the office-level price contagion effect by excluding LQP from equation (1). As shown in 
                                                          
15 We also compare the CARs between contagion firms with a LQAO (group 1 and 2; N=10,606) and non-
contagion firms (group 4), as well as between the CARs of contagion firms with a LQAF (group 1, 2 and 3; 
N=17,949) and non-contagion firms (group 4). Interestingly, we find that there is no significant difference in 
the CARs between the contagion firms with a LQAO/LQAF and non-contagion firms. The univariate results 
suggest that the contagion effect through the same audit offices or audit firms is no greater than the contagion 
effect through the same industry.  
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column (1), the coefficient on LQAO is negative and significant. This result supports the 
existence of office-level contagion effect documented in prior studies (e.g., Chaney and 
Philipich, 2002; Francis and Michas 2013)16. In column (2), we include variable LQP to 
examine the price contagion effect at the individual audit partner level. Consistent with H1, 
we find that the coefficient on LQP is negative and statistically significant at 1%. In contrast, 
after adding LQP, the coefficient on LQAO becomes nonsignificant. We find that the 
coefficient on LQAF is not statistically significant in both columns. Collectively, these 
results indicate that the office- (or firm-) level contagion effect documented in earlier 
studies is mainly driven by an audit partner-level effect. In terms of economic significance, 
the CARs is 0.5% lower for contagion firms that share common partners with the sanction 
firms, after we control for office and firm effects. This magnitude is economically 
significant, given that the mean and median values of five-day CAR around the 
corresponding sanction announcement date for all contagion firms and non-contagion firms 
are -0.15% and -0.57%, respectively (Panel A, Table 3).  
For the set of control variables, the coefficients on LEV, MTB and ROA are positive 
and significant, suggesting that contagion stock returns are higher for firms with higher 
profitability, growth opportunities and leverage. The significant and positive coefficient on 
CARsanction indicates that contagion stock returns are highly correlated with stock returns of 
sanction companies. In particular, more negative news released in financial fraud sanction 
                                                          
16We also run the same model with LQAF but without LQAO and LQP, however, we find that the coefficient 
on LQAF is nonsignificant. One possible explanation for the nonsignificant coefficient on LQAF, as indicated 
in the previous footnote, is that the contagion effect through the same audit firm is no greater than the 
contagion effect through the same industry since the selection of the non-contagion firms is from the same 
industry as the sanction firms.    
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leads to a more severe information spillover to other firms. The coefficient on ABS_DA is 
marginally significant and negative, which provides weak evidence that contagion firms 
with lower accounting quality suffer a more severe price contagion effect. Other variables, 
however, are not statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
Overall, our results are consistent with H1 that the sanction announcements induce 
stock price declines among the contagion firms owing to investors’ concerns over the low 
quality of audit partners. More importantly, our results show that the price contagion effect 
at the audit office level is driven by an individual audit partner-level effect, suggesting that 
the identification of audit partners provides information in the capital market additional to 
information from audit offices and audit firms. 
Cross-sectional Analysis for the Price Contagion Effect  
In this section, we consider two sets of factors that may potentially affect investors’ 
perception of LQP quality and their moderating effect on the magnitude of the market 
reaction. The first relates to the attributes of LQP – whether LQPs issued a modified audit 
opinion (MAO)17 and whether LQPs were from the TOP 10 audit firms (TOP10sanction).
18 
An individual audit partner who failed to issue MAOs to sanction firms indicates low audit 
quality because audit partners either could not detect the fraud or did not report the problem. 
We expect audit partners that issued MAOs to reduce investors’ concerns about auditors’ 
quality, leading to a less pronounced price contagion effect.  
                                                          
17 Consistent with the literature (Huang, Raghunandan, Chiou, and Huang 2014), we define Modified Audit 
Opinions (MAO) as one of the following: (1) unqualified opinions with explanatory notes, (2) qualified 
opinions, (3) disclaimers, and (4) adverse opinions. 
18 In our main regression model, we control for TOP10, the quality of audit firms that audit contagion and 
non-contagion firms. In comparison, TOP10sanction controls for the quality of audit firm that audits sanction 
firms during fraud period.  
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We expect LPQs from Top 10 audit firms (TOP10sanction) to affect the price contagion 
effect since the Top 10 are perceived to be high quality auditors in China (e.g., Fang, 
Pittman, Zhang and Zhao 2015). We also expect less price contagion for clients audited by 
Top 10 auditors. However, if the investors expect high quality audits from partners of large 
audit firms, the very fact that their audit clients are sanctioned would send a negative 
surprise shock to investors, resulting in a more negative market reaction. Thus, it is not 
clear ex ante whether the Top 10 audit firms can reduce or enhance the price contagion 
effect. 
 Our second set of factors relate to the characteristics of the sanction: the size of the 
sanction firm (LARGE_SANC) and the time lapse between the sanction announcement date 
and fraud committed period (N_LAPSE). Sanction announcements may induce a greater 
price contagion effect if sanction firms are larger because such sanction firms face stronger 
capital market pressure and draw more attention from investors (Gleason et al. 2008). 
Further, we expect a longer time lapse between the sanction announcement date and fraud 
period to have a less pronounced effect on price contagion because investors’ concerns 
about low quality audits or low quality partners may be reduced with the passage of time.  
To examine the impact of these moderating variables, we add the moderating variables 
and their interaction with LQP (LQAO, LQAF) in equation (1). We summarize the results 
(untabulated) below:  
Moderating effect of MAO: The result shows that the coefficient on LQP*MAO (MAO is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the sanction firm received a modified audit opinion 
during the financial reporting fraud periods and zero otherwise) is positive and significant 
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at the 5% level, suggesting that the price contagion effect at the individual audit partner 
level is less pronounced when the audit partners issue modified audit opinions to sanction 
firms.  
Moderating effect of TOP10sanction: The result shows that the coefficient on 
LQP*TOP10sanction (TOP10sanction is an indicator variable that equals one if the sanction firm 
was audited by a Top 10 audit firm during the fraud periods and zero otherwise) is 
significantly negative at the 5% level, indicating that the price contagion effect is more 
pronounced when the LQPs were from Top 10 audit firms. This result is consistent with 
the interpretation that LQPs of Top 10 audit firms are penalized more heavily if their clients 
are sanctioned for poor financial reporting.  
Moderating effect of sanction firm size: The result shows that the coefficient on 
LQP*LARGE_SANC (LARGE_SANC is an indicator variable that equals one if the sanction 
firm’s size is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise) is significantly negative 
at the 5% level, suggesting that the price contagion effect is more pronounced for larger 
sanctioned firms.  
Moderating effect of time lapse: The result shows that the coefficient on 
LQP*N_LAPSE is significantly positive at the 10% level, indicating that the price 
contagion effect is less pronounced when the time lapse between the sanction 
announcement date and fraud period is longer. 
IV. REPUTATION LOSS TESTS 
In this section, we report the research design, sample selection, and empirical results 
on the reputational losses of low quality partners after the regulatory sanctions. We expect 
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sanctions to impair partners’ reputation and diminish the value of the partners’ bonding 
services.  
Empirical Model  
In China, the audit market is highly competitive and characterized by a high degree of 
dispersion. To increase profits, the audit firm or audit partner typically must compete 
fiercely by retaining existing clients, acquiring new clients or charging fee premiums. To 
the extent that LQPs suffer from reputational losses subsequent to sanction announcements, 
we predict that the reputational losses of LQPs are likely to be reflected in (i) a larger 
market share decline after the regulatory sanctions and (ii) a higher likelihood of partner 
turnover. Specifically, we use the following models to test our predictions:  
∆MShare = δ0+ δ1 LQP+ δ2 LQAO+ δ3 LQAF + δ4 M_CASH+ δ5 M_GROWTH 
+ δ6 M_INVREC + δ7 M_ROA+ δ8 M_SIZE+ δ9 M_LEV+ δ10 M_LOSS 
+ δ11 M_ABS_DA + δ12 M_OPINION + δ13 M_TENURE+ δ14 TOP10 
+ Year/Audit office fixed-effects + ε               (2)  
Partner_change = δ0+ δ1 LQP+ δ2 LQAO+ δ3 LQAF + δ4 CASH+ δ5 GROWTH+ δ6 INVREC 
+ δ7 ROA+ δ8 SIZE+ δ9 LEV+ δ10 LOSS+δ11 ABS_DA + δ12 OPINION+ δ13 SANCTION 
+ δ14 TENURE+δ15 TOP10 +Year/Industry/Audit office fixed-effects + ε        (3)  
In equation (2), we examine the change in audit partners’ market shares after sanction 
announcements. ∆MShare is a partner-year level measure defined as a percentage change 
of a partner’s market share from year t to t+1, where market share is proxied by total client 
number, total client size and total audit fees, respectively (∆NUMBER, ∆SIZE, and ∆FEE). 
Year t is year that we identify LQPs from public sanction announcements. Our test variables 
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are LQP (whether the partner is identified as a low quality partner), LQAO (whether the 
partner is associated with a low quality audit office) and LQAF (whether the partner is 
associated with a low quality audit firm). A lower ∆MShare reflects the inability of the 
audit partner to retain existing clients or attract new clients. If the sanctions result in 
reputational loss of LQPs, we expect the coefficient on LQP to be significantly negative. If 
the sanctions also tarnish the reputation of the audit office and audit firm, we would expect 
the coefficients on LQAO and LQAF to be negative. This market share test provides insights 
on aggregated reputational losses of the audit partner after the announcement of financial 
reporting fraud.  
In equation (3), we examine audit partners’ retention by their existing clients after 
sanctions are publicly disclosed. Partner_change is an indicator variable that equals one if 
there is a change of the review partner in the year following sanction announcements and 
zero otherwise.19 Similar to equation (2), our key independent variables are LQP, LQAO, 
and LQAF. To the extent that the sanction announcements impair audit partner’s reputation, 
the partners may face a higher likelihood of dismissal by their existing clients. We therefore 
expect the coefficient on LQP to be significantly positive. If the sanctions also affect the 
audit office or audit firm associated with the LQP, we would expect the coefficients on 
LQAO and LQAF to be positive.  
We include a battery of control variables in equations (2) and (3) adapted from 
Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree (2009). Consistent with Swanquist and Whited (2015), 
                                                          
19 In this test, we examine the retention decisions for the review partner who undertakes more responsibility 
for the auditing process. We also examine the partner change for the engagement audit partner but find non- 
significant results, suggesting that partner turnover is observed mainly for the review partners. 
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we measure clientele characteristics at mean value of client attributes for each partner-year 
observation in equation (2). Definitions for controls are described in the Appendix. 
Specifically, we include ROA, LOSS, LEV and CASH to control for financial risk. More 
profitable firms pose less financial risk to the auditor, while higher leverage or firms with 
less cash increase the likelihood of financial difficulties, all of which will affect the audit 
outcome variables. We control for growth opportunities (GROWTH), level of inventories 
and receivables (INVREC) and audit opinions (OPINION) as proxies of audit risk. We 
control for firm size (SIZE) because the costs of auditing or changing auditors are expected 
to be higher for larger clients. We also control for the accruals (ABS_DA) and whether the 
firm is audited by one of the Top 10 audit firms (TOP10). Finally, we control for the 
partner’s tenure (TENURE) because of the mandatory rotation in China20. As before, we 
control for the year, industry and audit office fixed effects in the regressions.  
Sample Selection  
The sample selection procedures for reputational loss tests are shown in Table 5. Panel 
A indicates the sample selection for the market share change tests in equation (2). There 
are 16,506 partner-year observations during the sample period. Of these observations, we 
drop 3,781 observations with insufficient data to compute partner-year control variables 
and 1,347 partner-year observations without conducting audits in year t+1, possibly 
because they leave the audit market. Our final sample consists of 11,378 partner-year 
                                                          
20 Under Articles 3 and 5 issued by the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance (October 8, 2003), individual audit 
partners have to be rotated every five years or, in the case of newly listed companies, at the end of the second 
year following the initial public offering (IPO). The rule for newly listed companies requires that the IPO 
prospectus contains three years of audited financial statements, and so, the second year post-IPO is counted 
as the partner’s fifth year of tenure.  
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observations for the market share change model in terms of total client number and total 
client size. We further drop 1,889 observations without audit fee data, resulting in a final 
sample of 9,489 observations for the market share change model in terms of total audit fees. 
Table 5, Panel B, reports the sample selection for partner turnover tests in equation (3). 
There are 19,091 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2012. We drop 1,781 observations 
without audit partner information, 183 firms in the financial industry, and 1,715 
observations with insufficient data for the control variables. In addition, we drop 1,936 
firm-year observations where the partners do not conduct any auditing service in year t+1. 
Our final sample includes 13,476 firm-year observations to examine the association 
between LQP and the likelihood of partner change21.  
Panel A, Table 6, presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for market 
share change tests. The descriptive statistics of each variable are measured at the partner-
year level. On average, we observe a net increase in total market share based on number of 
clients, firm size and audit fees. Among all 11,378 partner-year observations, 4.04% 
partners were identified as LQP, 25.90% as LQAO, and 39.90% as LQAF. We report 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the audit partner change test in Table 6, Panel 
                                                          
21 We drop the observations where partners do not conduct any auditing service in year t+1 in both the market 
share change model and the partner change model because the partners could leave the auditing profession 
owing to reputation damage following the sanctions or any other reasons. Our results are robust if we do not 
drop the observations where partners do not conduct any auditing service in year t+1. Our results are also 
robust if we only drop the observations where the partners are barred from conducting audits in year t+1. 
Among the 460 partner-year observations identified as low quality partners, only 20 and 67 observations 
where partners were barred from providing audit service in the year following the sanction announcements 
in the market share change test, and partner change test, respectively.  
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B. On average, the partner turnover rate is 35.60%.22 Of these observations, 6.93% relates 
to LQP, 27.60% to LQAO, and 40.10% to LQAF.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Table 7 reports descriptive statistics and univariate analysis for the market share change 
and partner turnover of contagion firms and non-contagion firms. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 7, we observe a smaller increase in market share (△NUMBER, △SIZE, △FEE) of 
LQPs compared with contagion firms audited by other partners from the same office and 
audit firm. In addition, the mean value of Partner_change of contagion firms with common 
audit partner, contagion firms with common audit office (but not same partner), contagion 
firms with common audit firm (but not same office), and non-contagion firms are 0.4111, 
0.3604, 0.3700 and 0.3452, respectively. These statistics suggest that there is a greater 
turnover for LQPs following sanction announcements, compared with turnover in the 
contagion firms audited by other partners of the same audit office or audit firm. Consistent 
with these descriptive statistics, the univariate analyses in Panel B indicate that the 
differences in market share change and the partner change between LQPs and other partners 
of the contagion firms is statistically significant. Overall, Table 7 provides preliminary 
support for our two hypotheses (H2a and H2b)—that LQPs suffer greater reputational loss 
following the associated sanction announcement.  
Table 8, Panel A, presents regression results for equation (2). The dependent variable 
is market share change, where market share is measured by the percentage change in terms 
of number of clients (∆NUMBER), client size (∆SIZE), and audit fees (∆FEE) at partner-
                                                          
22In Huang et al. (2014), the percentage of both audit partners leaving the clients is about 20%. In our case, 
we define Partner_change as equal to one when the review partner leaves the client. Thus, the percentage of 
partner turnover is higher because there are many cases where companies just dismiss one of the partners.  
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year level. The negative and significant coefficients on LQP in all three columns support 
H2a. Taking the market change of client number as an example, we find that the market 
share change of LQPs is 11.7 percent smaller than that of other groups of individual audit 
partners. The coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with 
prior literature (i.e., Swanquist and Whited 2015). Overall, the evidence provides strong 
support that LQPs suffer from reputational damage in terms of smaller market share 
increases after sanction announcements.  
The smaller increases in market share for LQP may arise from the failure to retain 
current clients and/or inability to attract new clients. To distinguish the two causes, we 
define LOSS_NUMBER (LOSS_SIZE or LOSS_FEE) to capture market share loss in terms 
of number of clients (client size or audit fee). These variables are calculated as the 
percentage of clients that dropped an audit partner in year t+1 versus the total client size in 
year t. Similarly, we define ACQUIRE_NUMBER (ACQUIRE_SIZE or ACQUIRE_FEE) 
to measure acquisition in terms of the number of clients (client size or audit fee). We then 
use market share loss and market share new acquisition as dependent variables in equation 
(2). The results are reported in Panel B and C of Table 8, respectively.  
Table 8, Panel B, shows that the coefficients on LQP in all market share loss 
specifications are positive and statistically significant. These results support the contention 
that LQPs lose significantly more clients than other partners after the sanction was publicly 
announced.23  Table 8, Panel C, reports significant and negative coefficients on LQP, 
                                                          
23Although our results suggest that LQPs lose clients after the sanctions, we are unable to disentangle whether 
the loss in clients is due to clients switching away from an LQP or the audit firm assigns fewer clients to the 
LQP. This is a caveat that should be noted when interpreting the client loss results. Though we are not able 
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suggesting that LQPs acquire less new clients than other partners. Collectively, the results 
in Panels B and C support the contention that LQPs have lower market share change than 
others owing to the difficulty in retaining current clients and attracting new clients.  
Table 9 presents the regression results of equation (3). In column (1), the coefficient 
on LQP is positive and significant, indicating that low quality audit partners are more likely 
to lose clients following sanction announcements.24 In terms of economic significance, the 
marginal effect of engaging LQPs increases the probability of partner turnover by 5.57%.25 
In contrast, the coefficients on LQAO and LQAF are both nonsignificant, indicating that 
other partners in the contagion office or firm do not experience significant reputational 
losses. Because audit partners are mandated to rotate clients every 5 years in China, we 
include TENURE in the model to avoid finding a spurious relation. To further alleviate the 
confounding concerns of mandatory partner rotation, we drop firms for which the review 
partner is in the final year of tenure and repeat the test. The results are reported in column 
(2) of Table 9. We obtain consistent results as in column (1), indicating that our findings 
are not driven by the mechanical relation due to mandatory rotation.26  The evidence 
provides support for H2b, suggesting that low quality partners suffer from reputational loss 
                                                          
to tease out the two possible explanations, both are consistent with reputation loss of LQP. Client firms stay 
away because of impaired reputation of partner, and again, audit firm assigned fewer clients to the partner 
because of the impaired reputation of the partner. 
24 In this test, we include firms that are sanctioned by regulators and a control variable (SANCTION) that 
indicates the occurrence of sanction. Our results are robust if we remove these sanction firms and the variable, 
SANCTION, from the model.  
25The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of partner turnover with the employment of low 
quality partners relative to the benchmark firms. The marginal effect for LQP is computed as p x (1-p) x b, 
where p is the base rate (35.60%) and b is the estimated coefficient from the logistic regression (Liao 1994). 
26We also manually check the year when firms changed LQPs. In most of the cases (4291/4798=89.43%), the 
turnover occurred at less than the terminal fifth year; hence, our results on LQP turnover are not likely to be 
driven by the mandatory rotation policy. 
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in terms of a higher likelihood of partner change. 27  The coefficients on the control 
variables are generally consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Swanquist and 
Whited 2015). 
Overall, our evidence suggests that clients are more concerned about the quality of the 
audit partner than that of the audit office or the audit firm. Our results provide strong 
support for H2a and H2b, indicating that low quality partners suffer greater reputational 
losses in terms of lower market share change and a higher likelihood of partner change after 
sanctions against clients that they are associated with. 
V. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Alternative specification of LQPs for the Price Contagion Test  
In the main tests of price contagion effect, we define contagion firms with LQPs as the 
firms audited by low quality partners from the fraud periods and current period (defined as 
one year before the sanction announcement date). For completeness, we further separate 
the contagion firms with LQPs into three groups: (i) firms audited by LQPs during the fraud 
periods but not current period (LQPfraud=1); (ii) firms audited by LQPs in the current period 
but not during the fraud period (LQPcurrent=1); and (iii) firms audited by LQPs during both 
the fraud and current periods (LQPboth_periods =1). We replace LQP with LQPfraud, LQPcurrent 
and LQPboth_periods in equation (1). We report the results in Table 10, Panel A. In the interest 
of parsimony, we report only the main variables of interest in Table 10 and the subsequent 
                                                          
27 Following Swanquist and Whited (2015), we also examine the association between low quality audit office 
and office dismissal. Our results (untabulated) show that the likelihood of office change is significantly higher 
for firms audited by a low quality audit office, consistent with the results in Swanquist and Whited (2015). 
However, when we include LQP in the regression, the effect at the office level disappears.  
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tables. We find that all three indicator variables regarding LQP are significantly negative, 
suggesting that our results of a price contagion effect are not driven by any specific period 
definition.28  
We investigate whether there is a differential effect between low quality review 
partners and low quality engagement partners in the price contagion test. LQPreview 
(LQPengagement) is an indicator variable that equals one if the review (engagement) partner of 
contagion firms is of low quality but the engagement (review) partner is not and zero 
otherwise, whereas LQPboth_partners is an indicator variable that equals one if both the review 
and engagement partners are of low quality and zero otherwise. The results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 10. The coefficients on all three indicator variables are all significantly 
negative, indicating that investors react to the low quality of the review partner, engagement 
partner or both.29  
We next examine the effect of LQPs with repeated offenses on the price contagion. 
LQPs associated with multiple sanctions may indicate more severe quality issues, leading 
to a larger price contagion effect. However, if the stock price has impounded the 
information about LQPs who are sanctioned repeatedly, we would likely not observe a 
larger sanction-induced price contagion effect for these repeated offenders. Panel C, Table 
10, reports our test results, where LQPone (LQPmultiple) is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firms is audited by an LQP for one (multiple) time(s) of sanction(s) and zero 
                                                          
28We also compare the differences in the magnitude of coefficients among the LQP indicators. Our F-tests 
show that the coefficient on LQPboth_periods is significantly more negative than that on LQPfraud at the 5% level. 
Coefficients on LQPfraud and LQPcurrent or coefficients on LQP both_periods and LQPcurrent are not statistically 
different from each other.  
29Our F-tests show that there is no significant differences between any pair of partner indicator variables.  
37 
 
otherwise. We find that the coefficients on LQPone and LQPmultiple are both significant and 
negative, and the result from our F-test shows that there is no significant difference in 
magnitude between these two coefficients (F-statistic=2.13). The evidence suggests that 
the price contagion effect is similar for one-time or repeated offenders.30  
Finally, we examine whether there are differences in the price contagion effect of 
financial reporting fraud with individual audit partners being sanctioned and individual 
audit partners not being sanctioned by regulators. In the 327 sanction announcements used 
to identify LQPs, there are 53 cases with individual audit partners being sanctioned 
accompanied with fraudulent firms. Panel D, Table 10, reports our test results, where 
LQPsanction (LQPno_sanction) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firms is audited by 
LQP with (without) being sanctioned by regulator and zero otherwise. We find that the 
coefficients on LQPsanction and LQPno_sanction are both significant at the conventional levels, 
and the result from our F-test shows that there is no significant difference in magnitude 
between these two coefficients (F-statistics=0.21). The result suggests that investors 
perceived the audit quality of partners to be low, regardless of whether they are being 
sanctioned or not, so long as their clients are being charged of accounting malfeasance.  
Expanded Window Periods for the Price Contagion Test  
In our main analysis, we use CARs (-2, +2) to measure the market reaction of the 
sanction announcements. We also use alternative window periods to test robustness of our 
results. Following Aobdia et al. (2015), we use CARs in the alternative windows including 
(-1, +1), (-1, +2), (-2, +3), (-2, +5) and (-1, +10). We report the results in Panel A, Table 
                                                          
30As an additional robustness check, we exclude LQPs who are being sanctioned more than once from the 
sample. The results continue to hold. 
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11. The coefficients on LQP in all specifications are significantly negative, indicating that 
our main inferences remain unchanged with these alternative window periods. 
Excluding Contagion Firms in the Same Location or Same Business Group  
We examine whether our results regarding the price contagion effect still hold after 
excluding contagion firms located in the same location or contagion firms belonging to the 
same business group. It is possible that the sanction induced stock price decline is driven 
by the contagion firms located in the same region as the sanction firms or the contagion 
firms belong to the same business group as the sanction firms. We report the results of this 
sensitivity check in Panel B, Table 11. In column (1), we drop the contagion firms with the 
same location (province) as the corresponding sanction firms. In column (2), we redefine 
the non-contagion firms as firms with the same industry and same location (province) as 
the sanction firms and rerun the regression31. The coefficients on LQP in column (1) and 
column (2) are both significant and negative, indicating that our results are not driven by 
price contagion effect in the same location. In column (3), we exclude the contagion firms 
in the same business group as the corresponding sanction firm. The significant and negative 
coefficient on LQP suggests that the price contagion effect at the individual audit partner 
level is not driven by the contagion firms from the same business group as the sanction 
firms.  
Control for Partner Fixed Effects 
                                                          
31During the matching process, we are not able to find matched firms for some sanction firms (90 out of 327) 
in the same industry and same province. We therefore drop those sanction firms and corresponding contagion 
firms from the analysis. This explains the reduced sample size in column (2).  
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Although we control for a battery of variables in our regressions, we may have omitted 
some important individual audit partner characteristics that are associated with price 
contagion and reputational losses. Therefore, we include partner fixed effects in both the 
price contagion and market share changes tests to control for time invariant partner 
attributes such as expertise and experience. The results reported in Panel C, Table 11, are 
qualitatively the same as before. The coefficients on LQP remain significant in all 
specifications. This result suggests that the price contagion effect and associated 
reputational losses at the individual audit partner level is not driven primarily by partner 
attributes.  
Reduced Contagion Sample That Includes Only Sanction Firms with Negative CARs 
In our main analysis, we use all the sanction firms related to financial reporting fraud 
to identify low quality auditors, including audit partners, audit offices and audit firms 
because prior studies (e.g., Francis and Michas 2013; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian 2013) suggest 
that earnings management contagion through common audit offices or board interlocks 
reflect a systemic problem regardless of how the earnings management is recognized by 
the capital market. In our last sensitivity check, we use a reduced contagion sample 
following Gleason et al. (2008) and restrict the sample to contagion firms associated with 
sanction announcements with negative CARs. Specifically, we identify auditors associated 
with sanction firms whose CARs around the sanction announcement dates are negative as 
low quality.32 We repeat all our tests and report the results in Panel D, Table 11. 
                                                          
32Among the 327 sanction events used in our main analysis, 206 sanctions have negative CARs and 121 
have positive CARs.  
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Two insights emerge from this analysis. First, the stock returns contagion through low 
quality partners, captured by the coefficients on LQP, still exists for all specifications. 
However, the coefficients on LQAO or LQAF are all nonsignificant, suggesting that stock 
returns contagion occurs mainly through common low quality partners, rather than through 
common audit offices or audit firms in this reduced sample. Second, these partners continue 
to suffer from reputational losses in terms of lower market share change and higher partner 
turnover after the regulatory sanctions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines whether stock price contagion effect exists for low quality audit 
of individual audit partners and the associated reputational losses in China. We use the 
clients sanctioned by the Chinese government for financial reporting fraud to identify LQPs. 
We investigate whether market valuation of the contagion firms is affected by the 
identification of LQPs associated with regulatory sanctions. We find that such sanctions 
induce a significant stock price decline only among the contagion firms that share common 
LQPs. Additionally, we find that the price contagion effects of LQPs are less pronounced 
when the LQPs issue a modified audit opinion during the fraud period and when the time 
lapse between sanction announcement date and fraud period is longer. Further, the price 
contagion effect of LQPs is more pronounced when the sanction firms are audited by Top 
10 audit firms during the fraud periods and when the size of the sanction firm is larger. 
We next investigate whether LQPs suffer from reputational losses in terms of a reduced 
market share at the partner level and a higher likelihood of partner turnover. We find that 
the market share change of LQPs is significantly lower than that of other partners following 
sanction announcements. Further analysis indicates that the lower market share change of 
LQPs is caused by a failure to retain existing and attract new clients. At the client firm level, 
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we also find that LQP turnover is higher after sanctions are imposed. Collectively, our 
results indicate that there are real economic consequences for auditors that performed low 
quality audits. 
Our paper has important several policy implications. Apart from the real economic 
consequences of low quality audits by partners, this paper has implications for regulators 
around the world who are considering disclosing individual partner information in financial 
reports. Our study suggests that the identification of an audit partner is valued by the both 
the capital and audit labor market. The implication of the current study is that the disclosure 
of the identity of an individual engagement partner would likely, via the stock and labor 
market, help in enforcing accountability and in enhancing auditor quality.   
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Table 1 Sample selection procedure 
Panel A: sanctions selection   
Number of sanctions between 1999 and 2012 411 
Less: number of sanctions that   
    Have insufficient stock returns data  51 
    Have no information about individual audit partners  20 
    Have no shared individual audit partners with other firms  11 
    Are in the financial industry 2 
Number of sanction observations in our sample (275 unique firms)  327 
 
Panel B: contagion firms   
Number of observations that are matched with the above 327 sanction 
observations through common low quality audit firm  
21,654 
Less: number of matched observations that   
    Have insufficient stock returns data  1,142 
    Are in the financial industry  150 
    Have other public information disclosures 2,413 
Number of contagion observations in our sample  17,949 
contagion firms with common low quality partners  2,421 
contagion firms with common low quality audit offices 10,606 
contagion firms with common low quality audit firms 17,949 
 
Panel C: non-contagion firms  
Number of observations that are matched with the above 327 sanctions in the same 
industry and similar firm size  
17,592 
Less: number of matched observations that   
    Have insufficient stock returns data  1,343 
    Have other public disclosures  1,493 
Number of non-contagion observations in our sample  14,756 
 
Panel D: sample for price contagion model (for H1) 
contagion firms and non-contagion firms (17949+14756) 32,705 
Less:  
    Observations with insufficient data to calculate control variables  3,104 
Number of observations in the price contagion model  29,601 
 
This table provides details of our sample construction in the price contagion effect test. Panels A, B 
and C describe the sample selection procedures for the sanction sample, contagion firm sample and 
non-contagion firm sample, respectively. Panel D presents the sample for price contagion model. 
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Table 2 Sample description 
Panel A: Distribution of sanctioned firms, contagion firms and non-contagion firms by year  
Year  All 
listed firms 
Sanctioned 
Firms 
Contagion firms 
With LQP 
Contagion firms 
With LQAO 
Contagion firms 
With LQAF 
Non-Contagion 
Firms 
1999 927 5 35 66 66 220 
2000 1,062 5 39 100 100 235 
2001 1,140 14 89 254 273 627 
2002 1,204 28 219 495 623 1,154 
2003 1,268 20 181 441 523 831 
2004 1,356 26 218 654 864 1,252 
2005 1,352 20 137 433 571 889 
2006 1,435 15 137 311 472 650 
2007 1,549 15 85 377 578 618 
2008 1,603 15 83 354 468 686 
2009 1,752 27 202 1,011 1,325 1,286 
2010 2,107 24 235 872 1,295 1,075 
2011 2,336 35 236 1,607 2,311 1,621 
2012 2,385 78 525 3,631 8,480 3,612 
Total  21,476 327 2,421 10,606 17,949 14,756 
  
Panel B: Distribution of sanctioned firms, contagion firms and non-contagion firms by industry  
Industry  All  
listed firms 
Sanctioned  
Firms  
Contagion firms 
With LQP  
Contagion firms  
With LQAO 
Contagion firms  
With LQAF 
Non-Contagion  
Firms  
Agriculture  508 2 73 203 371 514 
Exploring  391 3 28 143 266 145 
Manufacturing  12,816 154 2,506 6,625 11,300 9,296 
Utilities  789 4 76 300 482 179 
Construction  441 4 52 234 397 112 
Transportation  811 10 65 330 523 343 
Technology  1,495 28 138 819 1,427 1,310 
Commerce  1,368 11 156 613 1,015 632 
Properties  667 17 84 347 584 460 
Services  663 43 72 308 501 462 
Media 189 12 19 76 163 13 
Conglomerate  1,094 39 152 608 920 1,290 
Total  21,476 327 2,421 10,606 17,949 14,756 
 
This table provides information on the sample distribution by year and by industry and descriptive 
statistics in price contagion effect tests. Panel A and Panel B show the distribution of all listed firms, the 
sanctioned firms, contagion firms and non-contagion firms by year and industry. Four distinct groups of 
firms are used in the analysis: (1) firms audited by low quality partners, which we denote as contagion 
firms with LQPs; (2) firms audited by low quality audit offices, which we denote as contagion firms with 
LQAOs (this group of firms also includes contagion firms with LQPs); (3) firms audited by low quality 
audit firms, which we denote as contagion firms with LQAFs (this group of firms also includes contagion 
firms with LQPs and contagion firms with LQAOs); and (4) benchmark firms with the same industry and 
similar firm size as the corresponding sanctioned firms, which we denote as non-contagion firms. Panel A 
shows the distribution of sanctioned firms, contagion firms and non-contagion firms by year; and Panel B 
shows the distribution of sanctioned firms, contagion firms and non-contagion firms by industry. 
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Table 3: Univariate analysis for the price contagion effect 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics in price contagion model (N=29,601)  
VARIABLES Mean Median  Q1 Q3 Std Dev. 
CAR(-2,+2) -0.0015 -0.0057 -0.0270 0.0190 0.0526 
LQP 0.0748 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2630 
LQAO 0.3230 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4680 
LQAF 0.5510 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4970 
SIZE 21.3700 21.2200 20.6700 21.9400 1.0480 
LEV 0.5380 0.5070 0.3150 0.6970 0.3350 
MTB 2.5330 1.8280 1.3390 2.8730 2.3970 
ROA 0.0405 0.0371 0.0120 0.0711 0.0770 
LARGEST 36.7600 34.4900 24.4300 47.9200 15.4900 
ABS_DA 0.0596 0.0421 0.0187 0.0800 0.0607 
TOP10 0.4350 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4960 
N_LINKS 0.4640 0.6930 0.0000 0.6930 0.4980 
N_LAPSE 0.4860 0.0000 0.0000 0.6930 0.5500 
SIZEsanction 21.0700 20.9000 20.4800 21.7800 1.0620 
CARsanction 0.0027 -0.0071 -0.0305 0.0212 0.0736 
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Panel B: Market reaction for contagion firms and non-contagion firms around sanction announcements  
 (1) Contagion firms with LQP 
(2) Contagion firms with LQAO 
(without LQP) 
(3) Contagion firms with LQAF 
(without LQP or LQAO) 
(4) Non-contagion firms  
 N=2421 N=8185 N=7343 N=14756 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CAR (-1,+1) -0.30%*** -0.46%*** -0.09%** -0.39%*** -0.04% -0.33%*** -0.11%*** -0.39%*** 
CAR (-2, +2) -0.56%*** -0.86%*** -0.12%** -0.57%*** -0.08% -0.46%*** -0.23%*** -0.59%*** 
CAR (-2, +3) -0.63%*** -0.74%*** -0.14%** -0.61%*** -0.07% -0.55%*** -0.28%*** -0.65%*** 
CAR (-2, +5) -0.53%*** -0.89%*** -0.16%** -0.71%*** -0.12%* -0.62%*** -0.32%*** -0.80%*** 
CAR (-2, +10) -0.63%*** -1.38%*** -0.31%*** -1.14%*** -0.23%*** -0.91%*** -0.55%*** -1.25%*** 
CAR (-2, +30)  -1.07%*** -2.17%*** -0.94%*** -2.24%*** -0.56%*** -1.95%*** -1.17%*** -2.35%*** 
Panel C: Univariate analysis in market reactions  
  
contagion firms in (1) vs  
contagion firms in (2)  
contagion firms in (1) vs  
contagion firms in (3)  
contagion firms in (1) vs  
non-contagion firms in (4)  
Variable 
Difference 
in Mean 
Difference 
in Median 
Difference 
in Mean 
Difference 
in Median 
Difference 
in Mean 
Difference 
in Median 
CAR (-1,+1) -2.58*** -1.96* -3.21*** -2.90*** -2.41** -1.59 
CAR (-2, +2) -4.38*** -3.32*** -4.61*** -4.18*** -3.35*** -2.52** 
CAR (-2, +3) -4.40*** -3.13*** -4.82*** -3.87*** -3.18*** -2.02** 
CAR (-2, +5) -2.86*** -2.45** -3.14*** -3.21*** -1.67* -1.33 
CAR (-2, +10) -1.94* -1.74* -2.41** -2.66*** -0.50 -0.38 
CAR (-2, +30)  -0.50 -0.38 -1.94* -2.04** 0.39 0.45 
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the samples used in the price contagion test. All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top one percentile to mitigate the undue 
influence of outliers. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in the Appendix. Panel B  reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in different intervals. CAR is calculated as a 
firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market return on the corresponding day. Day 0 is the day of a sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the 
announcement. Panel C report test statistics for differences in the CARs between the contagion firms with common partner and contagion firms with common audit office but without common 
partner, between contagion firm with common partner and contagion firms with common audit firm but without common partner or audit office, or between contagion firms with common partner 
and non-contagion firms. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
49 
 
Table 4 Results for the price contagion effect of low quality partners 
 
  Dependent Variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
LQP  -0.005*** 
  (-4.278) 
LQAO -0.002** -0.001 
 (-2.245) (-1.204) 
LQAF 0.001 0.001 
 (1.160) (0.976) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 
 (0.143) (0.122) 
LEV 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (2.891) (2.904) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.461) (3.430) 
ROA 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (5.143) (5.142) 
LARGEST 0.000 0.000 
 (0.279) (0.245) 
ABS_DA -0.010* -0.010* 
 (-1.647) (-1.654) 
TOP10 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.664) (-0.549) 
N_LINKS 0.000 0.001 
 (0.330) (0.836) 
N_LAPSE 0.000 0.000 
 (0.325) (0.511) 
SIZEsanction -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.757) (-0.808) 
CARsanction 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (2.788) (2.737) 
Constant -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.480) (-0.402) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 29,601 29,601 
Adjusted R2 1.8% 1.8% 
 
This table presents the results for the following regression:  
CAR = β0 + β1 LQP + β2 LQAO+ β3 LQAF + β4 SIZE + β5 LEV + β6 MTB + β7 ROA 
 + β8 LARGEST++ β9 ABS_DA+ β10 TOP10+ β11 N_LINK+ β12 N_LAPSE+ β13 SIZEsanction 
 + β14CARsanction+ Year/Industry/Audit office fixed-effects + ε 
The dependent variable is the firms’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the 
corresponding sanction announcement date (-2, +2), where date 0 represents the day of a 
sanction announcement, if it is a trading day, or the first trading day after the announcement. 
The daily abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted 
market return on the corresponding day. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in 
the Appendix. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. We report two sets 
of results. Model (1) is the regression without controlling partner effect LQP. Model (2) is the 
regression with controls for low quality partner LQP. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5 Sample selection for reputational loss 
 
Panel A: sample selection for market share change model (for H2a)  
Number of partner-year observations  16,506 
Less:  
Observations with insufficient data to calculate partner-year control variables  3,781 
Observations for partner-year without conducting audits in year t+1  1,347 
Number of partner-year observations in our sample for market share change model  11,378 
Less: observations without audit fee data  1,889 
Number of partner-year observations for market share change in terms of audit fee 9,489 
 
Panel B: sample selection for partner change model (for H2b) 
Number of firm-year observations  19,091 
Less:  
    Observations without partner information    1,781 
    Observations in the financial industry  183 
    Observations with insufficient data to calculate firm-year control variables  1,715 
    Observations for partner without conducting audits in year t+1 1,936 
Number of firm-year observations in our sample for partner change model  13,476 
                  
This table provides detailed information of the sample construction in the reputational losses tests. 
Panel A presents the sample selection procedure for the market share change model based on partner-
year observations. Panel B presents the sample selection procedure for partner change model based 
on firm-year observations.  
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics for reputational loss tests 
Panel A: Audit partner market share change test (N=11,378) 
VARIABLES Mean Median  Q1 Q3 Std Dev. 
△NUMBER  0.1850 0.0000 0.0000 0.3330 0.6600 
LOSE_NUMBER  0.3010 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.3600 
ACQUIRE_NUMBER  0.4820 0.2500 0.0000 1.0000 0.6460 
△SIZE 0.8600 0.1390 -0.1310 0.6250 2.7250 
LOSE_SIZE  0.2980 0.0000 0.0000 0.6140 0.3840 
ACQUIRE_SIZE  1.0420 0.0754 0.0000 0.7410 2.7340 
△FEE 0.3687 0.0526 -0.1852 0.5600 1.0300 
LOSE_FEE  0.2995 0.0000 0.0000 0.5670 0.3739 
ACQUIRE_FEE  0.5498 0.0000 0.7341 0.7341 0.9253 
LQP 0.0404 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1970 
LQAO 0.2590 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4380 
LQAF 0.3990 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4900 
MEAN_CASH 0.1750 0.1530 0.0979 0.2300 0.1090 
MEAN_GROWTH 0.1840 0.1130 0.0200 0.2350 0.3670 
MEAN_INVREC 0.2790 0.2680 0.1870 0.3570 0.1380 
MEAN_ROA 0.0266 0.0354 0.0130 0.0585 0.0761 
MEAN_SIZE 21.3700 21.2400 20.7500 21.8400 0.9910 
MEAN_LEV 0.5180 0.4850 0.3780 0.6020 0.2680 
MEAN_LOSS 0.1170 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2590 
MEAN_ABS_DA 0.0600 0.0490 0.0277 0.0772 0.0477 
MEAN_OPINION 0.0888 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2260 
MEAN_TENURE 1.9770 2.0000 1.0000 2.5000 0.9810 
TOP10 0.2990 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4580 
Panel B: Audit partner change test (N=13,476) 
VARIABLES Mean Median  Q1 Q3 Std Dev. 
Partner_change  0.3560 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4790 
LQP 0.0693 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2540 
LQAO 0.2760 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4470 
LQAF 0.4010 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4900 
CASH 0.1650 0.1320 0.0755 0.2180 0.1290 
GROWTH 0.2460 0.1490 -0.0108 0.3400 0.6570 
INVENC 0.2830 0.2580 0.1500 0.3920 0.1760 
ROA 0.0307 0.0364 0.0101 0.0675 0.0825 
SIZE 21.3500 21.2300 20.6100 21.9900 1.1140 
LEV 0.5090 0.4940 0.3460 0.6330 0.2690 
LOSS 0.1170 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3220 
ABS_DA 0.0600 0.0426 0.0192 0.0797 0.0590 
TOP10 0.3170 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4650 
OPINION 0.0928 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2900 
SANCTION 0.0161 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1260 
TENURE 2.1930 2.0000 1.0000 3.0000 1.3100 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the reputational loss tests. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top one percentile to mitigate the undue 
influence of outliers. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the market 
share change model. This panel shows the mean values of clients’ characteristics measured at the 
individual audit partner level. The sample size when dependent variable is △FEE is smaller 
(N=9,489) due to the missing audit fee data. And Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the partner change model. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 7 Univariate analysis for reputational losses  
 
Panel A: Likelihood of partner change and audit market share change  
 (1) LQP (2) LQAO (not LQP) (3) LQAF (not LQP or LQAO) (4) Others   
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
△NUMBER 0.0716 0.0000 0.2117 0.0000 0.2171 0.0000 0.1746 0.0000 
△SIZE 0.6503 0.0922 0.8674 0.1278 0.9877 0.1517 0.8412 0.1423 
△FEE 0.2415 0.0588 0.3653 0.0611 0.3996 0.0613 0.3716 0.0483 
Partner_change 0.4111 0.0000 0.3604 0.0000 0.3700 0.0000 0.3452 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis in reputational loss  
  (1) vs (2)  (1) vs (3)  (1) vs (4) 
 Difference in Mean  Difference in Median  Difference in Mean  Difference in Median  Difference in Mean  Difference in Median  
△NUMBER 4.13*** 4.16*** 4.09*** 3.85*** 3.33*** 3.48*** 
△SIZE 1.58 1.57 2.21** 2.04** 1.50 2.26** 
△FEE 2.27** 2.07** 2.81*** 2.65*** 2.44** 2.02** 
Partner_change -2.79*** -2.79*** -2.07** -2.06** -4.00*** -3.99*** 
 
This table presents the univariate analysis for reputational losses. Four distinct groups of firms or partners are used in this analysis: (1) LQP, which is the firms audited 
by low quality partners in partner change test and low quality partners in market share change tests; (2) LQAO (without LQP), which is the firms audited by low quality 
audit office but not low quality audit partners in partner change test and partners that are from low quality audit office but not low quality per se in the market share 
change tests; (3) LQAF (without LQAO or LQP), which is the firms audited by low quality audit firms but not low quality audit offices or low quality audit partners in 
partner change test and partners that are from low quality audit firm but not from low quality audit office and not low quality per se in the market share change tests; 
and (4) Others, which is the firms that are not audited by low quality auditors in partner change test and partners that are not from low quality audit firms in the marker 
share change tests. Panel A reports the mean value and median value of market share change in terms of total client number (△NUMBER), total client size (△SIZE) 
and total audit fee (△FEE) for different groups of firms, and likelihood of partner change for different groups of individual audit partners. Panel B reports the univariate 
analysis for differences in means and medians between firms audited by low quality partners and other groups of firms and also reports the univariate analysis for 
differences in means and medians between low quality partners and other groups of partners. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in the Appendix. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed tests.   
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Table 8 Results for low quality partners and market share change 
 Panel A: Total change in market share  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES △NUMBER  △SIZE  △FEE  
LQP -0.117*** -0.341*** -0.113** 
 (-3.934) (-2.939) (-2.256) 
LQAO 0.009 0.150 0.018 
 (0.388) (1.438) (0.449) 
LQAF 0.031 -0.008 0.016 
 (1.330) (-0.078) (0.421) 
MEAN_CASH -0.321*** -0.639** -0.295** 
 (-4.667) (-2.016) (-2.440) 
MEAN_GROWTH -0.046*** -0.147** -0.030 
 (-2.606) (-2.542) (-1.052) 
MEAN_INVREC 0.019 -0.815*** -0.013 
 (0.373) (-3.677) (-0.149) 
MEAN_ROA 0.018 0.057 -0.020 
 (0.154) (0.094) (-0.100) 
MEAN_SIZE 0.017** -0.884*** -0.127*** 
 (2.045) (-20.821) (-8.598) 
MEAN_LEV -0.083*** -0.148 -0.241*** 
 (-3.027) (-0.928) (-5.004) 
MEAN_LOSS -0.034 0.098 -0.012 
 (-0.997) (0.605) (-0.198) 
MEAN_ABS_DA 0.168 1.227* 0.649** 
 (1.088) (1.759) (2.557) 
MEAN_OPINION 0.040 0.312* 0.053 
 (1.056) (1.675) (0.777) 
MEAN_TENURE -0.034*** -0.027 -0.037*** 
 (-5.121) (-0.944) (-3.393) 
TOP10 -0.061** 0.073 -0.043 
 (-2.100) (0.572) (-0.892) 
Constant 0.119 19.870*** 2.957*** 
 (0.622) (21.451) (7.438) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,378 11,378 9,489 
Adjusted R2 4.9% 11.9% 7.5% 
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Panel B: Client losses  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LOSS_NUMBER  LOSS_SIZE  LOSS_FEE  
LQP 0.048*** 0.044** 0.051*** 
 (2.768) (2.313) (2.677) 
LQAO 0.000 0.002 -0.012 
 (0.024) (0.129) (-0.832) 
LQAF -0.001 0.004 0.007 
 (-0.093) (0.327) (0.475) 
MEAN_CASH 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.135*** 
 (2.630) (2.846) (3.078) 
MEAN_GROWTH 0.005 -0.008 0.007 
 (0.504) (-0.730) (0.600) 
MEAN_INVREC 0.014 0.021 0.025 
 (0.489) (0.666) (0.747) 
MEAN_ROA -0.034 0.019 -0.022 
 (-0.505) (0.248) (-0.307) 
MEAN_SIZE -0.013*** -0.008* -0.007 
 (-2.828) (-1.717) (-1.262) 
MEAN_LEV 0.008 0.004 0.010 
 (0.464) (0.195) (0.517) 
MEAN_LOSS 0.037* 0.038* 0.038* 
 (1.944) (1.880) (1.792) 
MEAN_ABS_DA -0.008 -0.007 0.025 
 (-0.096) (-0.088) (0.271) 
MEAN_OPINION 0.033 0.031 0.047* 
 (1.555) (1.405) (1.824) 
MEAN_TENURE 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 
 (12.799) (12.202) (12.465) 
TOP10 0.006 0.010 0.013 
 (0.422) (0.614) (0.771) 
Constant 0.448*** 0.346*** -0.012 
 (4.354) (3.236) (-0.101) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,378 11,378 9,489 
Adjusted R2 7.6% 6.9% 7.9% 
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Panel C: Client acquisitions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ACQUIRE_NUMBER  ACQUIRE _SIZE  ACQUIRE _FEE  
LQP -0.068** -0.286** -0.095** 
 (-2.445) (-2.490) (-2.187) 
LQAO 0.008 0.140 0.010 
 (0.350) (1.334) (0.276) 
LQAF 0.029 0.016 0.027 
 (1.283) (0.167) (0.761) 
MEAN_CASH -0.217*** -0.542* -0.200* 
 (-3.109) (-1.681) (-1.688) 
MEAN_GROWTH -0.037** -0.180*** -0.050** 
 (-2.060) (-3.109) (-1.964) 
MEAN_INVREC 0.037 -0.736*** -0.006 
 (0.714) (-3.273) (-0.072) 
MEAN_ROA -0.010 -0.314 -0.127 
 (-0.086) (-0.516) (-0.676) 
MEAN_SIZE 0.004 -0.873*** -0.141*** 
 (0.473) (-20.489) (-9.960) 
MEAN_LEV -0.073*** -0.170 -0.194*** 
 (-2.650) (-1.045) (-4.258) 
MEAN_LOSS 0.008 0.171 0.015 
 (0.239) (1.046) (0.271) 
MEAN_ABS_DA 0.135 1.109 0.387 
 (0.877) (1.583) (1.642) 
MEAN_OPINION 0.069* 0.401** 0.094 
 (1.823) (2.141) (1.449) 
MEAN_TENURE 0.013* 0.022 0.017 
 (1.873) (0.758) (1.588) 
TOP10 -0.057** 0.059 -0.029 
 (-2.001) (0.454) (-0.645) 
Constant 0.566*** 19.660*** 2.899*** 
 (2.927) (21.154) (9.040) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,378 11,378 9,489 
Adjusted R2 5.6% 11.9% 6.7% 
This table presents the results for the association between low quality partner and the change in partner’s market share, 
based on the following regression:  
∆MShare = δ0+ δ1 LQP+ δ2 LQAO + δ3 LQAF+ δ4 M_CASH+ δ5 M_GROWTH+ δ6 M_INVREC 
+ δ7 M_ROA+ δ8 M_SIZE+ δ9 M_LEV+ δ10 M_LOSS+ δ11 M_OPINION+ δ12 M_TENURE + Year/Audit office 
fixed-effects + ε 
The dependent variables are ∆MShare, which is the percentage change in market share of the audit partner measured 
in terms of total client number, total client size and total audit fees from year t to year t+1 for each partner-year 
observation (∆NUMBER, ∆SIZE, and ∆FEE), where year t is the time period that we identify low quality partners 
from the regulatory sanctions. Panel A reports the regression results of association between low quality partner and total 
market share change ∆MShare; we separate the failure to retain clients in terms of losing more clients and failure to attract 
clients in terms of acquiring less clients in Panel B and Panel C. The clientele characteristics are measured at the mean 
value of the client attributes for each partner-year observation. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined 
in the Appendix. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for individual partner clustering. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 9 Results for low quality partners and partner change 
  
  Dependent Variable=Partner_change  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
LQP 0.243*** 0.282*** 
 (2.858) (3.240) 
LQAO -0.081 -0.067 
 (-1.018) (-0.814) 
LQAF 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.012) (-0.049) 
CASH 0.829*** 0.908*** 
 (4.769) (5.136) 
GROWTH -0.046 -0.026 
 (-1.476) (-0.816) 
INVENC 0.126 0.173 
 (0.942) (1.224) 
ROA -0.039 -0.204 
 (-0.102) (-0.527) 
SIZE -0.020 -0.034 
 (-1.021) (-1.595) 
LEV -0.085 -0.093 
 (-0.916) (-0.985) 
LOSS 0.249*** 0.259*** 
 (3.187) (3.257) 
ABS_DA 0.769** 0.719** 
 (2.323) (2.086) 
TOP10 0.178** 0.200** 
 (2.212) (2.349) 
OPINION 0.314*** 0.287*** 
 (3.989) (3.640) 
SANCTION -0.050 -0.082 
 (-0.318) (-0.517) 
TENURE 0.224*** 0.085*** 
 (16.776) (5.283) 
Constant 0.391 0.549 
 (0.263) (0.368) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 13476 12791 
Pseudo R2 4.8% 3.9% 
This table presents the results for the association between low quality partner and partner change based on the 
following regression:  
Partner_change = δ0+ δ1 LQP+ δ2 LQAO+ δ3 LQAF + δ4 CASH+ δ5 GROWTH+ δ6 INVREC+ δ7 ROA 
+ δ8 SIZE+ δ9 LEV+ δ10 LOSS+ δ11 OPINION + δ12 SANCTION +δ13TENURE 
 +Year/Industry/Audit office fixed-effects + ε 
The dependent variable is Partner_change, an indicator variable that equals one if there is a change in audit 
partner following the sanction. Detailed definitions of the variables are outlined in the Appendix. The t-
statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. We report two set of results. Model (1) is the regression 
result for all the firm-year observation during the sample period. Model (2) is the regression result after dropping 
observations where the partner is in the final year of the tenure. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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                 Table 10 Additional tests for the price contagion effect   
Panel A: Different types of contagion firms with LQP  
  Dependent Variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
VARIABLES                       (1) 
LQPfraud -0.003* 
 (-1.772) 
LQPcurrent -0.004* 
 (-1.793) 
LQPboth_periods -0.007*** 
 (-5.246) 
Controls  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations 29,601 
Adjusted R2 0.9% 
 
Panel B: Contagion firms with low quality review partner, engagement partner or both 
  Dependent Variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
VARIABLES                      (1) 
LQPreview -0.004*** 
 (-2.614) 
LQPengagement  -0.005** 
 (-2.472) 
LQPboth_partners -0.006*** 
 (-3.277) 
Controls  Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations 29,601 
Adjusted R2 1.8% 
 
Panel C: Contagion firms with LQP involved in sanction for one or multiple times 
  Dependent Variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
VARIABLES                      (1) 
LQPone -0.003** 
 (-2.297) 
LQPmultiple -0.006*** 
 (-4.270) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations 29,601 
Adjusted R2 1.8% 
 
Panel D: Contagion firms with LQP sanctioned by regulatory or not 
  Dependent Variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
VARIABLES                      (1) 
LQPsanction -0.006* 
 (-1.844) 
LQPno_sanction -0.005*** 
 (-4.009) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect  Yes 
Observations 29,601 
Adjusted R2 1.8% 
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This table presents the results for some additional tests in the price contagion effect. All control variables are 
not tabulated for parsimony. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. Panel A reports the 
results for different contagion firms with a LQP during the fraud period, during current period or during both 
of periods. Panel B reports the results for different contagion firms with low quality lead partner, with low 
quality concurring partner, or with both of partners. Panel C reports the results for different contagion firms 
with a LQP involved in sanctions for one time or for multiple times. Panel D reports the results separately for 
LQPs being sanctioned and LQPs not being sanctioned by regulator. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 11 Other sensitivity checks  
Panel A: Alternative windows for the price contagion effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES [-1,+1] [-1,+2] [-2,+3] [-2,+5] [-1,+10] 
LQP -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008* 
 (-2.651) (-3.826) (-4.701) (-2.939) (-1.712) 
LQAO -0.001* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (-1.753) (-1.424) (-1.490) (-0.566) (0.504) 
LQAF 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.000 
 (1.141) (1.051) (1.826) (0.608) (0.133) 
Controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,601 29,601 29,601 29,601 29,601 
Adjusted R2 1.5% 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 1.0% 
 
Panel B: Excluding contagion firms with the same location and business group as the sanction firms 
  Dependent variable=CAR(-2,+2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Exclude contagion 
firms with the  
same location  
as sanction firms 
Non-contagion firms  
as firms in the same industry 
and location  
as sanction firms  
Exclude contagion 
firms in same 
business group  
as sanction firms 
LQP -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.807) (-3.644) (-4.094) 
LQAO -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.323) (-1.466) (-1.056) 
LQAF 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.905) (0.591) (1.056) 
Controls  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Audit Office Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 25,429 16,497 29,319 
Adjusted R2 2.0% 2.9% 1.8% 
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Panel C: Controlling for the partner fixed effect 
 Price contagion Market share change Partner change 
VARIABLES  CAR(-2,+2) △NUMBER △SIZE △FEE Partner_change 
LQP -0.005*** -0.125*** -0.241* -0.120* 0.277*** 
 (-4.343) (-3.163) (-1.676) (-1.762) (2.779) 
LQAO -0.001 0.024 0.088 0.047 -0.081 
 (-0.910) (0.732) (0.699) (0.877) (-0.862) 
LQAF 0.002 0.020 0.000 -0.039 0.014 
 (1.183) (0.688) (0.003) (-0.819) (0.167) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Partner Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 29,601 11,378 11,378 9,489 13,476 
Adjusted R2 7.4% 16.7% 32.5% 22.9% 20.4% 
 
Panel D: Contagion firms of the sanctioned firms with only negative CARs 
 Price contagion Market share change Partner change 
VARIABLES  CAR(-2,+2) △NUMBER △SIZE △FEE Partner_change 
LQP -0.005*** -0.099*** -0.339*** -0.097* 0.191* 
 (-4.343) (-2.941) (-2.862) (-1.696) (1.938) 
LQAO -0.001 -0.042 -0.012 -0.059 -0.029 
 (-0.910) (-1.394) (-0.100) (-1.236) (-0.291) 
LQAF 0.002 0.047 0.015 0.011 -0.024 
 (1.183) (1.624) (0.127) (0.241) (-0.262) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Partner Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 29,601 10,118 10,118 8,471 12,002 
Adjusted R2 7.4% 5.5% 12.6% 6.8% 4.7% 
 
Panel A presents results with expanded window periods to test robustness of the results. We use CARs in the window 
periods including (-1, +1), (-1, +2), (-2, +3), (-2, +5) and (-2, +10). Panel B presents results after excluding other kinds 
of possible price contagion effects. Model (1) is the regression results after dropping observations with the same 
location (province) as the corresponding sanction firms. Model (2) is the regression where we define the benchmark 
firms (non-contagion firms) with the same industry and same location as the sanction firms. Model (3) is the regression 
results after dropping observations with the same business group as the corresponding sanction firms. The sample size 
for this model is much smaller because we delete the sanction events without benchmark firms (non-contagion firms) 
owing to industry and location restrictions. Panel C reports the results when we repeat all our tests after controlling 
for partner fixed effects, including price contagion tests, market share change tests, and partner change tests. The 
regression models are as described in the footnotes of t h e  p r e v i o u s  tables. Panel D reports results when we 
identify low quality auditors (LQP, LQAO, and LQAF) associated with the sanctioned firms with negative CARs 
around the sanction announcement date. We then repeat our tests for the price contagion effect, market share change, 
and partner change. The regression models are as described in the footnotes of the previous tables. All control 
variables are not tabulated for parsimony. The t-statistic in parentheses is adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix: variables definition 
Dependent variables  
CAR The five-day CARs around sanction announcements for non-sanction 
contagion firms and non-contagion firms. Daily abnormal return is 
calculated as a firm’s raw return minus the weighted adjusted market 
return on the corresponding day.  
Partner_change An indicator variable that equals one if the client employed a different 
individual audit partner in year t+1, compared with year t, and zero 
otherwise.  
∆NUMBER Percentage change in total client number audited by the partner, 
calculated by (total client number in year t+1 - total client number in 
year t)/total client number in year t. 
∆SIZE Percentage change in total client size audited by the partner, calculated 
by (total client size in year t+1 - total client size in year t)/total client 
size in year t. 
∆FEE Percentage change in total audit fee earned by the partner, calculated by 
(total audit fee in year t+1 - total audit fee in year t)/total audit fee in 
year t. 
LOSS_NUMBER Percentage in losing client number audited by the partner, calculated by 
number of losing clients in year t+1/total client number in year t. 
LOSS_SIZE Percentage in losing client size audited by the partner, calculated by total 
size of losing clients in year t+1/total client size in year t. 
LOSS_FEE Percentage in losing audit fee audited by the partner, calculated by audit 
fee of losing clients in year t+1/total audit fee in year t. 
ACQUIRE_NUMBER Percentage in acquiring client number audited by the partner, calculated 
by number of acquiring clients in year t+1/ total client number in year t. 
ACQUIRE_SIZE Percentage in acquiring client size audited by the partner, calculated by 
total size of acquiring clients in year t+1/total client size in year t. 
ACQUIRE_FEE Percentage in acquiring audit fee audited by the partner, calculated by 
audit fee of acquiring clients in year t+1/total audit fee in year t. 
Variables of interest  
LQP An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares at least one common partner with a sanctioned firm, and 
zero otherwise.  
LQAO An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firms 
audited by the same audit office as the sanction firms and zero otherwise. 
LQAF An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
audited by the same audit firm as the sanction firms and zero otherwise. 
Control variables   
SIZE Natural log of a client firm’s total assets.  
LEV The client’s total liabilities, scaled by total assets.  
MTB The client’s market value of equity, scaled by book value of equity.  
ROA The client’s net income, scaled by total assets. 
LARGEST The client’s largest shareholder’s ownership. 
ABS_DA The absolute value of the residual from the regression models in Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005). 
TOP10 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is audited by Top 10 
audit firm and zero otherwise. The definition of Top 10 audit firms is 
based on the ranking of total client size in specific year.  
N_LINKS The natural log of one plus the number of year in which the clients were 
audited by low quality partners, low quality audit offices, or low quality 
audit firms.  
N_LAPSE The natural log of one plus the number of years that have elapsed since 
the last fraud year to the year of sanction. 
SIZEsanction Natural log of the sanction firm’s total assets. 
CARsanction The CARs of sanction firms over a five-day window (-2, +2) that spans 
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the day of first announcement for sanction. 
GROWTH The client’s one-year percentage growth in company’s total assets. 
INVENC The sum of inventory and receivables, scaled by total assets. 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals one if the client’s net income is 
negative, and zero otherwise  
CASH The client’s total cash, scaled by total assets. 
OPINION An indicator variable that equals one if the client receives a modified 
audit opinion, and zero otherwise  
SANCTION An indicator variable equals one if the client is sanctioned for financial 
reporting fraud, and zero otherwise.  
TURNOVER The client’s total sales, scaled by total assets.  
TENURE The length of partner’s tenure for firm in years. 
MAO An indicator variable that equals one if sanction firm was issued 
modified audit opinion during the fraud period and zero otherwise. 
TOP10sanction An indicator variable that equals one if the sanction firms were audited 
by Top 10 audit firm during the fraud period, and zero otherwise. 
LARGE_SANC An indicator variable that equals one if the size of corresponding 
sanction firm is greater than the median of size of sanction firms and 
zero otherwise.  
LQPfraud An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares at least one common partner with a sanctioned firm during 
the fraud period but not during the current period which is the year 
before the sanction announcement date, and zero otherwise. 
LQPcurrent An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares at least one common partner with a sanctioned firm during 
the current period but not during the fraud period, and zero otherwise. 
LQPboth_periods An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares at least one common partner with a sanctioned firm during 
the current period and also during the fraud period, and zero otherwise. 
LQPreview An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares lead partner but not the concurring partner with a 
sanctioned firm, and zero otherwise. 
LQPengagement  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares concurring partner but not the lead partner with a 
sanctioned firm, and zero otherwise. 
LQPboth_partners An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares both of lead partner and concurring partner with a 
sanctioned firm, and zero otherwise. 
LQPone An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares common partners that are involved in financial reporting 
fraud for only one time with a sanctioned firm, and zero otherwise. 
LQPmultiple An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a contagion firm 
which shares common partners that are involved in financial reporting 
fraud for multiple times with a sanctioned firm, and zero otherwise. 
LQPsanction An indicator variable that equals one if the firm if a contagion firm with 
LQP who is also sanctioned by regulatory and zero otherwise.  
LQPno_sanction An indicator variable that equals one if the firm if a contagion firm with 
LQP who is not sanctioned by regulatory and zero otherwise. 
M_X The mean of a client-level variable (X) for all the engagements within a 
partner-year.  
  
  
 
